MISPLACED TRUST
Why development banks should not rely on their clients to address reprisal risks
MISPLACED TRUST  Why development banks should not rely on their clients to address reprisal risks.

Coalition for Human Rights in Development, July 2023

This report was written by Dalile Antúnez, Collaborative Researcher at the Coalition for Human Rights in Development. We additionally acknowledge the valuable insights of Maia Seeger (Executive Director, Sustentarse), Nina Lesikhina (Policy Officer, CEE Bankwatch Network), Hannah Storey (Policy Advisor on Business and Human Rights, Amnesty International), Christian Donaldson (Senior Policy Advisor, Oxfam International), and the various participants of the Defenders in Development campaign. The views expressed herein, and any errors or omissions, are solely the authors'.

“Misplaced Trust” is based on the analysis of 38 case studies included in three other reports previously published by the Coalition for Human Rights in Development. We acknowledge all the organizations and human rights defenders who contributed to these case studies.

This report is an initiative of the Defenders in Development Campaign, which engages in capacity building and collective action to ensure that communities and marginalized groups have the information, resources, protection and power to shape, participate in, or oppose development activities, and to hold development financiers, governments and companies accountable.

More information: rightsindvelopment.org/misplaced-trust contact@rightsindvelopment.org

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ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>Development Finance Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCP</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Commitment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESIA</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPIC</td>
<td>free, prior and informed consent</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>human rights defender</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRDD</td>
<td>human rights due diligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Integrated Safeguards System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICI</td>
<td>IDB's Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Performance Requirement</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGP</td>
<td>UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</td>
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Client
In this report, with the term “client” we refer to the public or private entities directly receiving any type of financial support (grants, loans, equity, etc) from development banks. Clients can therefore include governments, state agencies, private corporations, or consortiums made up of a mix of public and private actors.

Development finance institutions
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are national or international institutions that provide loans, grants and other types of financial or technical support for projects, activities and policies around the world. National DFIs receive money from the States that own them, while multilateral institutions often receive a contribution from each of their member countries, as well as additional funds from wealthier countries. Much of these funds come from public, taxpayer money, but DFIs may also raise money in other ways, such as charging interest on their loans. DFIs are owned and governed by governments, and they generally have public interest missions, such as poverty alleviation and sustainable development. In this report, we will also interchangeably use the generic word ‘banks’ or ‘development banks’.

Human rights defenders

Human rights due diligence
Human rights due diligence (HRDD) describes an ongoing process necessary to identify, mitigate, and address adverse human rights risks and impacts. For DFIs, HRDD should be considered as an ongoing process necessary to ensure that they respect, protect, and work toward the fulfillment of human rights. This involves identifying human rights risks and impacts directly or indirectly connected with the DFI’s activities; preventing human rights abuses; mitigating adverse human rights impacts, and maximizing positive human rights impacts where possible; accounting for how human rights are impacted and impacts are addressed, and remediating any adverse impacts.

Retaliation/reprisal
In this report, the terms ‘retaliation’ and ‘reprisal’ will be used interchangeably to indicate any type of intimidation or attack against human rights defenders and community members who are targeted for expressing their opinion, sharing information, raising concerns, criticizing or opposing a development project. Retaliation can include different types of targeted attacks, such as: defamation or stigmatization campaigns, harassment, intimidation, threats, arrests, detention, criminalization, travel or work bans, extortion, unfair administrative measures, gender-based violence, attacks on livelihoods, attacks on properties, physical attacks, maltreatment, torture, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, and killings.

Retaliation risk assessment
Retaliation risk assessment is part of HRDD. It is an ongoing process necessary to identify and mitigate risks of reprisals in or related to a project or a bank activity, or that might impact the outcome of that project or bank activity. Reprisal risk assessment should take into account information related to the project, project implementers, the general context, and the civic space situation in the country. It should include specific risk factors for vulnerable groups. The elaboration of such assessment should be carried out in reprisal-sensitive consultations with civil society organizations and HRDs, especially those who have experienced reprisals and their allies.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Too often, human rights defenders (HRDs) and community members who express their views or speak out against projects funded by development banks face high risks of reprisals, ranging from threats to killings. “Misplaced Trust,” which is based on the analysis of 38 case studies of reprisals in the context of development projects, shows that in most cases development banks’ clients play a direct role in the perpetration of these attacks. Yet, development banks continue to entrust their clients with addressing reprisals, assessing the project risks and impacts, and conducting consultations.

The first part of this report shows how clients – in almost all the cases – are directly or indirectly responsible for the retaliation in the context of their projects. In some instances, they are directly behind the reprisals or coordinating the actions of the perpetrators. In others, they are instigating the attacks, intentionally dividing the community, and creating tensions.

Time is money, and clients benefit from hastening project development and minimizing scrutiny. In responding to these incentives, they typically fail to create opportunities for meaningful participation or to proactively prevent reprisals. They often avoid disclosing possible reprisal risks or opposition to their projects. In highly repressive contexts, they can also take advantage of the silencing of dissent by state agencies.

In the second part, this report provides a review of the relevant aspects of the policies, declarations and guidelines published by eight major multilateral development banks, in relation to the prevention and response to retaliation, stakeholder engagement, and consultations with the communities affected by their projects. This section shows how development finance institutions (DFIs) are relying heavily on the clients for their due diligence, including crucial steps such as mapping stakeholders, conducting consultations, and addressing reprisal issues.

Finally, “Misplaced Trust” offers a series of recommendations that development banks should follow to ensure an independent analysis of retaliation risks in the context of their projects, as well as adequate prevention and response measures. Implementing zero tolerance for reprisals requires DFIs to stop delegating reprisal risk assessment and response to clients. Instead, DFIs should develop – in close consultations with human rights defenders and civil society organizations – protocols and guidelines for what they will do themselves on reprisal issues during the entire project cycle.

2 The 38 case studies were included in three reports previously published by the Coalition for Human Rights in Development with its members and partners (see methodology section for further details).
3 Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), IDB Invest, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and World Bank.
INTRODUCTION
As many CSOs have documented, community members and defenders expressing concerns, voicing their opinion, or sharing information about activities supported by development banks are often threatened, criminalized, attacked, and even murdered. Reprisals send a chilling message to the wider community, curtail the opportunities for participation and engagement – which are mandatory according to most bank policies – and end up jeopardizing the success of the project itself.

The need to prevent and address reprisals is clear, and it should be an essential component of human rights due diligence (HRDD). Ongoing advocacy efforts and campaigns – led by HRDs and civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world – have led to some development banks recognizing, in their safeguards policies or ad-hoc statements, the importance of addressing reprisals in the context of the projects they fund.

Yet, DFIs – even though they acknowledge this need – tend to make a fundamental mistake, which turns their commitments to ensuring participation and tackling reprisals into empty words. In the vast majority of cases, development banks place the primary responsibility to assess/mitigate reprisal risks and respond to reprisals on the clients, despite the fact that clients are often directly or indirectly responsible for perpetrating the attacks. Clients also have conflicts of interest that might prevent them from disclosing or addressing reprisal risks.

This report shows how development banks rely too heavily on the client for carrying out crucial steps related to HRDD, such as mapping the affected communities, conducting consultations, engaging with stakeholders, and assessing the project’s environmental and social risks. The lack of proper due diligence and meaningful

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5 There is a conflict of interest when a person, company or institution has two or more contradictory interests in the development of a specific action. Conflicts of interest can be personal or institutional.

consultations is a key factor that can lead to the escalation of reprisals. Yet, too often development banks are merely supervising the reports provided by the clients, without accounting for the fact that clients might avoid disclosing information that could jeopardize the approval or continuity of their activities.

As outlined in the second part of this report, most DFIs — in their environmental and social policies — also have some provisions that allow for independent evaluations in specific contexts, which can be relevant for assessing and addressing retaliation risks. However, these policies are discretionary and optional, without clearly establishing how and under what conditions they must be applied.

As indicated in the recommendations, it is crucial for DFIs to assume direct responsibility for the assessment of reprisal risks and for preventing, addressing and remedying reprisals. DFIs should develop protocols and guidelines on reprisal issues that cover the entire project cycle and that should be prepared in close consultations with CSOs, in particular those specializing in human rights issues, as well as with defenders and groups that have directly experienced reprisals in the context of development projects. And most of all, DFIs should be directly responsible for implementing them, instead of relying solely or primarily on their clients for the assessment of reprisal risks, and for the prevention and response to reprisals.
METHODOLOGY
METHODOLOGY

The first part of “Misplaced Trust” consists of a review of 38 case studies, analyzing reprisals against HRDs who have opposed, criticized, expressed their opinion, or shared information about projects and activities funded by development banks. The case studies were documented by members and partners of the Coalition for Human Rights in Development in three reports: Uncalculated Risks (2019), Unhealthy Silence (2021), and Wearing Blinders (2022). They refer to reprisals that have affected one or more HRDs, linked to a project (or a set of linked projects) funded by one or more development banks. For each case study, we analyzed whether the client had direct or indirect responsibility for the reprisal. It is important to note that none of these cases were originally chosen for their respective reports with a lens to evaluate the client’s role. However, we chose this sample as they were cases for which we had existing information.

In total, the cases document reprisals in 27 countries and projects funded by 30 development banks. A table with a summary of the cases, as well as the reference to the reports with further info on each of them, can be found in the Annex A. For the specific sources of information analyzed for each case study, please refer to the methodology section in the relevant report.

For 30 out of the 38 cases analyzed, there was also information on the level of consultations and engagement with the affected communities. We used this information to assess whether the clients failed to conduct adequate consultations and ensure consent, as these failures can lead to high levels of social conflict and eventually contribute to reprisals.

CLIENTS’ RESPONSIBILITY

In this report, we differentiate between direct and indirect responsibility for reprisals. In 36 out of the 38 case studies analyzed, the responsibility for the reprisals can be directly attributed to the clients.

- We consider clients **directly responsible** when they – or any actor hired by them – have been involved in the reprisals by threatening, stigmatizing, slandering, denouncing, criminalizing, physically harming defenders, or generating internal divisions and instigating others to commit reprisals. We also consider the clients directly responsible when they have control or influence over the perpetrators; for example, when the client is a private company and the reprisals are perpetrated by security forces partially funded by them, or acting to protect their facilities/assets.

- We consider clients **indirectly responsible** when they create conditions that increase conflict and favor retaliations, such as failing to ensure consent, bypassing meaningful consultations, or doing inadequate assessment of project risks and impacts.

In this analysis, the cases are classified according to whether the client is a country or a public institution, a private company, or a combination of actors from the private and public sectors.

When the client is a public entity – or a combination of the private and public sectors – and reprisals are perpetrated by public security forces, state agencies, or any public authority, then in this analysis we attribute direct responsibility to the client. This is also the case when the perpetrator belongs to a different state agency since we assume that if the loan or grant is assigned to a public entity, then there is a relationship of subordination, influence, control, or coordination between this entity and the other public actors responsible for the reprisals.

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8 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

9 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), African Development Bank (AFDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos (BANOBRAS), Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Bank of China (BOC), Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), China Development Bank (CDB), Mexican Fondo de Fondos (CMIC), Development Bank of Germany (DEG), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Development Fund (EDF), European Investment Bank (EBB), Danish Export Credit Agency (EKF), EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-ATIF), Export Import Bank of China (China Ex-Im), Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation (Finnfund), Dutch Development Bank (FMO), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Inter-American Development Bank Invest (IDB Invest), International Finance Corporation (IFC), German Development Bank (KfW), German Export Credit Bank (Kfw Ipex), Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA), New Development Bank (NDB), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM) and the World Bank (WB).

10 This includes all cases where the client is aiding and abetting the parties who carry out the reprisals, or fails to prevent reprisals as a result of negligent behavior.

When retaliations are perpetrated by public security forces, private clients can also be considered responsible when the security officers are acting to protect their headquarters, buildings, facilities, and property, or they are receiving resources from them.

It is worth noting that clients should also be considered directly responsible when reprisals are conducted by their project-level grievance mechanisms, subsidiaries, financial intermediaries’ clients, consulting firms, or companies responsible for building associated facilities. Project-level grievance mechanisms, for instance, are often indicated by development banks as a possible avenue to deal with reprisals. However, this is highly problematic because they are set up and operated by the clients themselves, they have the same conflict of interests, and can be directly involved in the reprisals.

DFIS’ RESPONSIBILITY

Development banks are responsible for preventing and responding to reprisals under international human rights law, which establishes obligations on DFIs’ shareholder States and the DFIs themselves.

It is incontrovertible that DFIs must – at the very least – meet the basic standards applicable to any business enterprises: to respect human rights by avoiding infringing on the human rights of others and addressing adverse human rights impacts that their activities might cause or contribute to. This basic responsibility applies to any financial institutions that – like any other enterprise – may be directly linked to human rights impacts through their investments.

However, as State-owned entities, DFIs must also meet the higher standards and responsibilities applicable to States, which cannot “deploy international financial institutions to violate international law when they cannot do so in their capacity as individual States.” According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), States must take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by DFIs they own or support, by requiring human rights due diligence.

In their policies, most DFIs recognize the principle of participation and require the implementation of plans for involving and engaging different stakeholders, a principle that cannot be fulfilled when people voicing their concerns face reprisals. In addition, some development banks have established specific policies or statements where they commit to addressing retaliations against human rights defenders due to the nature of their work, their vulnerabilities, and the social impacts of threats or attacks against them. The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states that “everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels.”

12 Of all the cases documented, only one (Coal Projects in Bataan province) refers to projects that received DFI funding only through financial intermediary clients. All other cases involve some direct financing by DFIs.
14 See Mombasa-Mariakani Road Project (Kenya) case study in Uncalculated Risks.
17 Responsibility for complicity of international financial institutions in human rights violations in the context of retrogressive economic reforms”, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (former Independent Expert on Foreign Debt and Human Rights), July 2019, [https://www.undocs.org/A/74/177R](https://www.undocs.org/A/74/177R)
18 UNGP, principle 4.
against those who express critical opinions about their projects (see further details in the second part of this report).

In line with these obligations, DFIs are responsible for acting with due diligence in order to prevent and mitigate reprisals in the context of their investments. They must also take actions to ensure no repetition and help provide access to remedy if reprisals do occur.
PART 1
ANALYSIS OF THE CASES OF REPRISALS
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KEY FINDINGS

The cases of reprisals in the context of development projects analyzed in this chapter show that:

1. In all but two of the cases, clients – including state actors, private companies, and combinations of both – play a role in the perpetration of reprisals against defenders.
2. Reprisals where the responsibility can be attributed to the clients include threats, violent attacks, surveillance, harassment, smear campaigns, criminalization, destruction of property, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), dismissals from jobs, and killings.
3. Reprisals are typically perpetrated by public or private security forces, private companies’ management and other staff/contractors, and state and government officials supporting the projects.
4. Public security forces often play a role in perpetrating, contributing to or facilitating reprisals in the context of development projects.
5. In most cases, clients also contribute to the conditions that could have led to or exacerbated the likelihood of reprisals. For example, they often fail to disclose project risks and adverse impacts, and to provide safe spaces and channels for meaningful communication with communities to voice concerns, questions, or grievances throughout the project cycle; or they continue with the project without the clear consent of communities to proceed.

In 36 out of the 38 cases, the client was directly responsible for at least some of the reprisals occurring in the context of their projects because they either perpetrated the attacks, instigated them, or collaborated with other actors (in most cases, state security forces) who committed them. Not all the reprisals documented in the case studies were carried out by the clients or directly connected to them, as some case studies also refer to anonymous perpetrators. However, in all cases, defenders themselves or members of their community indicate that the reprisals occurred as a result of the activism around the project, their opposition, or the fact they shared information or raised concerns about it.

There was no clear evidence of the client’s direct responsibility only in two cases, although the available information shows that the reprisals were linked to the defenders’ opposition to the project.

In all cases, DFIs financing the projects delegated their responsibility under international human rights law to the clients, without adequate supervision or monitoring. By entrusting their clients to conduct key due diligence processes, development banks failed to adequately assess reprisal risks and prevent attacks, and instead ended up bankrolling violations and attacks against defenders.

BY ENTRUSTING THEIR CLIENTS TO CONDUCT KEY DUE DILIGENCE PROCESSES, DEVELOPMENT BANKS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ASSESS REPRISAL RISKS AND PREVENT ATTACKS, AND INSTEAD ENDED UP BANKROLLING VIOLATIONS AND ATTACKS AGAINST DEFENDERS.
According to the reports analyzed, the two cases where hard evidence of the client’s responsibility was missing were “Jirau Dam” (Brazil) and “Coal projects in Bataan” (Philippines). The defenders in both cases, however, were clearly killed as a result of their activism.

In the first case, HRD Nilce de Souza Magalhães was killed after bringing a complaint against the consortium operating the dam (ESBR). In March 2017, someone was sentenced to 15 years in prison for her murder. The investigation shifted the spotlight onto a personal conflict, but her community believes de Souza was targeted because of her activism. Other people who opposed the dam also received death threats. Moreover, the lack of due diligence in assessing the project impacts could have exacerbated social conflicts that eventually led to the reprisal.

In the second case, HRD Gloria Capitan – a community activist who had spoken out against coal projects in Bataan province – was shot dead by two unidentified men. According to the report “Uncalculated Risks”, it remains unclear who ordered the attack and who was behind the anonymous threat. What is clear is that she was killed because she chose to speak out.
MISPLACED TRUST

CASES OVERVIEW

CLIENT'S RESPONSIBILITY

Total cases 38
- Public clients 17
- Private clients 14
- Combination of public and private 7

Cases where clients were directly responsible 36

SECTORS

COVID-19 response 9
- Hydro 7
- Energy 7
- Mining 4
- Agriculture 3
- Land & natural resources management 3
- Factories and infrastructures 3
- Financial services and budgetary support 2

TYPES OF REPRISALS

* In total, in the 38 cases analyzed, clients were directly/indirectly responsible for the killing of at least 135 people.

PERPETRATORS

Police and public security forces
- Judiciary
- Local/government authorities
- Company security personnel
- Company personnel
- Forest service guards/rangers
- Military

21 This data indicates in how many of the 38 cases this type of reprisals occurred, not the total number of attacks.
Further information on each case, including reference to the reports where cases are analyzed, can be found in Annex A.
In 2020, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved four projects to support the COVID-19 response in Nicaragua, for a total of US$ 44.4 million and US$ 20 million respectively. According to the available project documents, both banks failed to conduct meaningful due diligence and to ensure that people could freely speak out on aspects related to the project. They entrusted their client (Nicaragua) with carrying out all the assessments, failing to take into account that the government receiving their loan was actively attacking those expressing dissenting views and criticizing the shortcomings of the COVID-19 response.

In May 2020, more than 700 medical professionals signed a statement criticizing the government’s response to the pandemic. Many signatories to the statement were threatened, and several were dismissed from their jobs as a retaliation for speaking out against their government’s inadequate response to the crisis.

For further details on this case, see “Unhealthy Silence”, pp 35 - 37.
In 17 out of the 38 cases, the clients were state actors (including governments and state-owned companies). In all these cases, these state actors were allegedly responsible for the reprisals occurring in the context of their projects, or at least for some of them. In most of these cases, the perpetrators were police officers or other public security forces, acting to protect their government’s interest in advancing the projects and to intimidate defenders criticizing or opposing the projects.23

In most of these cases, the perpetrators were police officers or other public security forces, acting to protect their government’s interest in advancing the projects and to intimidate defenders criticizing or opposing the projects.

The most common reprisals were threats, violent attacks, arbitrary detentions, and criminalization, often during protests against projects or policies.24 Criminalization often involved the use of spurious charges, legislation restricting the right of freedom of expression, and lengthy prison sentences.25 In many cases, government officials were also threatening HRDs,26 publicly smearing them and stigmatizing them. In three cases27 the officials dismissed public employees; for example, in Nicaragua and Sudan defenders were fired after voicing concerns around the COVID-19 response. There were also several cases of torture and killings.28

In all the cases where there was also available information on stakeholder engagement, it emerged that state clients failed to meaningfully consult with the affected communities and failed to create a safe, meaningful and inclusive environment for participation, a factor that has very likely contributed to exacerbating social conflict and escalating the risks of reprisals.29 In some cases, the banks also failed to ensure the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples affected by their projects. Where consent was withheld or unverified, banks failed to put the project financing on hold. There were also failures in the assessment of adverse social and environmental risks of the projects, as well as non-compliance with social and environmental standards.30

23 In only three cases the public actors who perpetrated reprisals did not include public security forces: Mombasa Mariakani Road Project (Kenya) and the COVID-19 response project in Nicaragua and Jordan.
24 COVID-19 response project in Guinea and Guatemala, Land Management and Administration Project (Cambodia), and Khimti-Dhakelbar Transmission Line (Nepal).
25 Promoting Basic Services Program (Ethiopia), Land Management and Administration Project (Cambodia), East-West Corridor Highway Project (Myanmar), Khimti-Dhakelbar Transmission Line (Nepal), COVID-19 response project in Bangladesh, China, Guatemala, Jordan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
26 Mombasa Mariakani Road Project (Kenya), Land Management and Administration Project (Cambodia), West Corridor Highway Project (Myanmar), Khimti-Dhakelbar Transmission Line (Nepal), COVID-19 response project in Uzbekistan, Kaliwa dam (Philippines).
27 In Nicaragua, the government ordered the dismissal of those doctors who had protested against some aspects of the COVID-19 response funded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. In Sudan, the government fired a female civil servant for criticizing the COVID-19 response. In Myanmar, Saw Hla Ngwe was removed as village administrator reportedly for refusing to take legal action against residents for damages to a road that led to the quarry.
28 Natural Resource Management Program (Kenya), Land Management and Administration Project (Cambodia), Khimti-Dhakelbar Transmission Line (Nepal), Toro Semliki reserve (Uganda), Kaliwa dam (Philippines), COVID-19 response project in Bangladesh, China and Guinea.
29 Promoting Basic Services Program (Ethiopia), Mombasa Mariakani Road Project (Kenya), Land Management and Administration Project (Cambodia), East-West Corridor Highway Project (Myanmar), Khimti-Dhakelbar Transmission Line (Nepal), Toro Semliki reserve (Uganda), COVID-19 response project (Turkmenistan), and Kaliwa dam (Philippines).
30 Promoting Basic Services Program (Ethiopia), Natural Resource Management Program (Kenya), Water Tower Protection and Climate Change Programme (Kenya), Land Management and Administration Project (Cambodia), East West Corridor Highway Project (Myanmar), Toro Semliki reserve (Uganda), COVID-19 response project (Turkmenistan), and Kaliwa dam (Philippines).
The Eólica del Sur wind farm, in the Tehuantepec isthmus in Oaxaca, was set to be the largest in Latin America. The project received financial support from national and international financiers, including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), despite the opposition of the local Ikojt and Binnizá Indigenous Peoples living in the area.

When community members started protesting against the project, they faced widespread reprisals. They reported attacks by company employees, local authorities, and other project supporters. More than 40 community members were criminalized. Dozens of people were harassed, threatened, physically attacked, and lost access to electricity services and health care.

In 2017, one of the community leaders was beaten to death. In 2018, another human rights defender was shot and killed. Civil society groups believe that the murders of five other community members in 2018 are also related to the social conflict over the project. Despite the known risks, as community members had already faced reprisals, the IDB approved US$ 72 million in financing for the project. The IDB flagged the project as “high risk”, but nevertheless it approved the funding and failed to take action to address reprisals.

In September 2016, the IDB accountability mechanism released its investigation report, finding the bank had failed to comply with requirements to ensure good faith consultation with Indigenous Peoples. The report also found that the IDB lacked adequate guidance for situations of social conflict.
Out of the seven cases where the projects were implemented by a combination of public and private actors:

- in six cases, government authorities or public security forces were directly responsible for the reprisals; in three of these cases, also the private companies implementing the project were involved.\(^\text{35}\)
- one case involved reprisals that could not be linked directly to the client, according to the available information.\(^\text{33}\)

Reprisals included harassment, threats, stigmatization, physical attacks, arbitrary detentions, and criminalization. In one case, the military police was used as a de facto private security for the company, which also provided funding to purchase equipment.\(^\text{34}\)

Reprisals that distinctively and differentially affected women defenders were also documented, such as women defenders subjected to body cavity searches\(^\text{35}\) and a case of “reputational exploitation” where photos or videos were digitally manipulated to make it appear that the defender had done something scandalous.\(^\text{36}\)

Apart from having perpetrated, instigated or commissioned the reprisals, clients were also responsible for the lack of meaningful engagement and consultations, which increased the levels of conflict and exacerbated reprisal risks. In six of these cases, the reports also referred to the lack of consultation with stakeholders, lack of FPIC of the indigenous communities,\(^\text{37}\) and deficiencies in implementing banks’ policies and assessing the risks and impacts.\(^\text{36}\) In some cases, there was also a lack of compliance with the bank’s policies and commitments.

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\(^{32}\) Khimti-Dhakelbar Transmission Line (Nepal), Belo Monte (Brazil), and Hidroituango (Colombia).

\(^{33}\) Jirau Dam (Brazil), see footnote n 12.

\(^{34}\) Belo Monte Dam (Brazil).

\(^{35}\) Cotton sector (Uzbekistan).

\(^{36}\) LUKoil (Kazakhstan).

\(^{37}\) Mareña Renovables/Eólica del Sur (Mexico), Belo Monte (Brazil), Jirau Dam (Brazil), Mareña Renovables/Eólica del Sur (Mexico), Belo Monte (Brazil), Jirau Dam (Brazil).

\(^{38}\) Hidroituango (Colombia), Southern Gas Corridor (Azerbaijan), LUKoil Overseas Karachaganak (Kazakhstan).
Between 2007 and 2016, the EBRD and IFC financially supported the development of the Amulsar gold mine near the spa town of Jermuk in Armenia, through a series of equity investments. Local communities strongly opposed the project because of the risk of toxic contamination and the serious impacts on health, the environment, and their livelihoods, which were mainly based on agriculture and tourism. The banks’ investments in this project, despite the opposition of local communities, show serious failures in the HRDD process. Local communities were not adequately consulted, and their concerns, including around reprisals and repression of dissent, were left unaddressed.

These failures led to an escalation of social tension and reprisals, with those opposing the project facing harassment, threats, attacks, and criminalization. The company filed more than 20 defamation lawsuits against activists, two media outlets, and even two members of the parliament. Some of these cases are still ongoing. The company’s security personnel militarized the area and threatened people; an employee from the company was also involved in a sexist online attack and surveillance against a woman human rights defender. Both DFIs eventually withdrew from the project, but did not provide any type of remedy for the attacks that took place as a result of their failures to adequately assess and manage reprisal risks.

For further information, please see Wearing Blinders, pp. 20 - 25.
In all the 14 case studies where the clients were private companies, the reprisals were perpetrated by employees working for the companies; in 11 of them, also public security forces or public authorities were involved.

Private security guards perpetrated acts of violence against the communities, surveilled defenders, and used excessive force against protesters. Women HRDs experienced particular forms of violence, such as sexual harassment and smearing campaigns based on gender stereotypes. Militarization in the project locations also led to increased incidents of gender violence and rapes, although many of these attacks go under-reported.

In many cases, companies acted in coordination with public security forces, providing resources for them or requesting them to guard the company’s properties. For example, in the case of the Yanacocha mine in Peru, the company forcefully evicted a family and, together with the local police, destroyed the family’s home and physically assaulted them.

In another case in Peru (Las Bambas mine), the police and the military made arrangements with a mining company to guard the project’s area prior to a planned general strike. They set up a police base within the mine’s property and detained at least 17 people inside the mine for more than 24 hours. Some protesters were allegedly beaten and deprived of food, and two of them spent eight months in pre-trial detention before being finally released on bail.

In 11 cases, the police intimidated defenders, carried out arbitrary detentions, acted with violence, and used excessive force against defenders. During several of those incidents, the security forces killed and injured human rights defenders.

Companies also stigmatized and smeared HRDs using the press and social media, used civic litigation to deter defenders from criticizing the projects, and issued formal complaints that led to fines, arbitrary detentions, and lengthy prison sentences.

In nine of the projects implemented by private actors, there were also deficiencies in stakeholder consultation and engagement, and in the assessment of risks and impacts of the projects, including: lack of FPIC of project-affected Indigenous Peoples, failure to take into account local communities’ opposition to the project, lack of information about the project impacts, and ineffective bank oversight. In one case, there was also a lack of safe working conditions, non-compliance with housing commitments for migrant workers, and insufficient wages. All these factors contributed to creating conflicts and increased retaliation risks against community members or workers.
PART 2

ANALYSIS OF DFIS’ POLICIES

Alexandria Portland Cement Company (Titan), Egypt.
Clients have a clear conflict of interest that prevents them from disclosing retaliation risks, and from responding effectively to retaliation that they are in most cases responsible for. Yet, as outlined in the following section, banks tend to rely on client-generated information for key processes (such as environmental and social risk assessments, stakeholder engagement, and consultations with affected communities) that are key to assessing and mitigating reprisal risks, and to preventing, addressing or remedying reprisals.

The analysis looks at the environmental and social frameworks, as well as public statements, guidelines, and any document specifically related to the management of reprisal risks, of eight of the largest multilateral development banks. This analysis doesn’t include statements and protocols adopted by independent accountability mechanisms to prevent and address retaliations. DFIs also have other types of processes to guide their strategies and priorities, which may include components that are also relevant to the assessment of retaliation risks (such as country diagnostics). However, this report focuses on the analysis of safeguards policies at the project level, where all other assessments or processes implemented to evaluate reprisal risks should be integrated.

Finally, the analysis focuses on the standards that DFIs apply to projects they finance directly, where there is a higher degree of supervision of project risks and impacts. However, it is worth noting that DFIs apply even weaker due diligence standards for projects implemented through financial intermediaries. Although safeguards still apply and project implementing actors should be compliant, the oversight is typically delegated to the intermediary, and the banks only conduct an analysis of the environmental and social management systems implemented. Moreover, the lack of information and disclosure around projects implemented through financial intermediaries means that communities are unable to identify key decision-makers to address and raise concerns about reprisal risks.

**Speciﬁc Policies and Commitments on Reprisals**

1. Some DFIs (EBRD, IDB, IDB Invest, IFC and World Bank) have adopted speciﬁc documents or statements on reprisals, while others (AfDB and EIB) incorporated speciﬁc provisions on reprisals in their environmental and social safeguards.

2. IDB-Invest and IFC have jointly adopted speciﬁc guidance for clients, but without indicating speciﬁc procedures for the banks themselves.

3. The IDB adopted technical notes to support its own staff, borrowers, and executing agencies to identify and evaluate reprisal risks.

4. Some DFIs (AfDB, EBRD, EIB, IDB, IDB Invest, IFC and World Bank) include in their policies speciﬁc criteria related to the assessment of risks posed by the use of public or private security forces.

5. All policies analyzed, with the exception of the IDB technical notes, place the responsibility for key steps in the assessment of reprisal risks mainly on the client, without clearly establishing which procedures the bank staff must follow to assess reprisal risks and to prevent and respond to reprisals.

6. Since the assessment of project risks and impacts – as well as the identiﬁcation of project-affected people and consultations with them – is generally a responsibility of the clients, bank policies do not ensure that HRDD processes can be adequately carried out, and that reprisal risks can be effectively identiﬁed and mitigated.

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52 Some banks may have additional internal documents and guidelines related to reprisals, but this analysis is based on the publicly available documentation.

53 While independent accountability mechanisms policies are highly relevant, they focus on retaliations that may occur in the context of complaints and thus are not directed to the assessment of reprisal risks in all projects, or to the prevention of reprisals more generally.

OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES

1. For certain projects that affect Indigenous Peoples, most policies require their FPIC.\textsuperscript{55}
2. All social and environmental policies require the participation of project-affected people free of coercion and intimidation in different stages of the projects, for example, in the assessment and management of environmental/social risks and impacts, and in the design and implementation of mitigation measures.
3. Social and environmental policies attribute the responsibility for the assessment of the risks/impacts of the projects to the client. For specific projects in sensitive or high-risk contexts, or affecting Indigenous Peoples, the policies of all DFIs indicate that independent experts could or should be hired to conduct the assessments; however, this is generally optional, and there are no rules or guidelines to ensure the experts are truly independent.
4. Social and environmental policies place the responsibility for consulting with stakeholders on the client. For certain types of projects, most policies also indicate the need for stricter scrutiny by the bank, or the participation of independent third parties, but these further measures are generally optional.
5. In general, the banks assume the responsibility of reviewing the information produced by the clients to monitor compliance with their policies, providing technical cooperation to support the implementation of the safeguards, detecting gaps in the information, verifying that the social management plan covers the different risks and impacts of the project, and verifying the client’s capacity to comply with social and environmental safeguards. The possibility of the bank making site visits\textsuperscript{56} and engaging independent third parties to monitor different aspects of the projects is established in certain cases (ADB, AfDB, EBRD, EIB, IDB, IDB Invest, IFC and World Bank), but it is mostly discretionary.

Five men in uniform stand ready, with rifles and body armor.

\textsuperscript{55} The only bank analyzed that does not require FPIC is the ADB, which only requires the consent (intended as broad community support) of affected Indigenous Peoples for certain cases. On the difference between informed consent and broad community support, see “Effective Participation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent”, Forest Peoples Programme, 2016, https://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2016/03/fpp-fpic-not-fpicon-final.pdf

\textsuperscript{56} Bank staff are often claiming they have decided not to make site visits ‘for fear of causing reprisals’. However, site visits are important and should be conducted in a safe way, ensuring they do not exacerbate risks, and planned in close consultation with affected communities and their allies.
MISPLACED TRUST

The ADB has not published any specific declaration, guidance, or protocol related to reprisal risks or response to reprisals in the context of its projects. The only specific guidelines are related to the protection of key stakeholders in the context of complaints submitted to the independent accountability mechanism.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

Reprisals
The Safeguard Policy Statement, approved in June 2009, only makes specific reference to reprisals in provisions related to the grievance redress mechanism implemented by the client at the project level. It requires prior and informed meaningful consultations with affected persons and requires consultations to be undertaken in an atmosphere free of intimidation or coercion. However, the policy does not establish any procedure aimed at assessing reprisal risks in the context of the projects, as well as procedures to prevent and respond to reprisals.

Consultations
As a general rule, the responsibility for meaningful consultations is placed on the client. The participation of ADB project teams in consultation activities is only contemplated for projects with significant adverse environmental impacts, involving involuntary resettlement or impacting Indigenous Peoples. The policy also establishes that ADB will assure itself, through its own investigation, that broad community support for the project has been demonstrated by the Indigenous Peoples communities.

Assessment of risks and impacts
The responsibility of assessing the project’s environmental and social risks and impacts is attributed to the client. Only assessments in the context of highly complex and sensitive projects (related to the environment, involuntary resettlement, or Indigenous Peoples) require independent advisory panels of experts not affiliated with the project during project preparation and implementation. However, provisions for

57 The ADB is currently reviewing and updating its 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement. Further information on the campaign led by a group of CSOs for stronger safeguards on reprisals can be found here: https://rightsindevelopment.org/news/recommendations-to-adb-from-communities-facing-reprisals
58 ADB Guidelines for the Protection of Key Stakeholders during the Accountability Mechanism Process, bit.ly/40U45df
60 ADB SR 1 (par. 20); SR 2 (par. 29); SR 3 (par. 22).
61 ADB SPS (par. 32, 54). See also SR 1 (par. 19), SR 2 (par. 28), SR 3 (par. 10).
62 ADB SPS (par. 54); SRs: Environment (par. 19); Involuntary Resettlement (par. 28); Indigenous Peoples (par. 10).
63 ADB SPS (par. 54).
64 ADB SPS (par. 55).
65 ADB SPS (par. 73); SR 1 (par. 4); SR 2 (par. 15); SR 3 (par. 13); SR 4 (par. 2).
66 “Highly Complex and Sensitive Projects” are projects that ADB deems to be highly risky or contentious or involve serious and multidimensional and generally interrelated potential social and/or environmental impacts. See ADB SR 1 (par. 16); SR 2 (par. 24); SR 3 (par. 19).
ascertaining when projects are complex or sensitive is discretionary and the development of a panel of independent advisory experts is not subject to input from affected communities or civil society, making the decision-making processes around this highly opaque.

Additionally, when the project affects Indigenous Peoples, an Indigenous Peoples’ expert is required on the advisory panel. For projects that involve activities in critical habitats, the client is also required to retain qualified and experienced external experts to assist in conducting the assessment. In projects that involve negotiated land acquisition, the policy requires the client to engage an independent external party to document the negotiation and settlement processes, in order to address the risks of asymmetry of information and bargaining power.

Clients are required to submit periodic monitoring reports on the implementation of the project. For projects with significant impacts and risks, they must retain qualified and experienced external experts or qualified NGOs to verify monitoring information, and for highly complex and sensitive projects, they must use independent advisory panels. Projects that affect Indigenous Peoples require the client to use dynamic mechanisms to monitor project implementation, such as inspections and audits, to verify compliance with the Indigenous Peoples Safeguards.

The policy defines “external experts” as experts not involved in day-to-day project implementation or supervision. This means they are not necessarily independent or external from the client, since they are selected and hired by the client to monitor the project. The policy does not define the Independent Advisory Panel required for certain projects.

**The bank’s role**
The ADB assumes responsibility for conducting due diligence and for screening, reviewing, monitoring and supervising social and environmental assessments and plans, to ensure that clients comply with the policy requirements during project preparation and implementation. Through due diligence and review, the bank assesses whether all potential social and environmental impacts and risks have been identified and that safeguards plans include effective measures to avoid, minimize, mitigate or compensate adverse impacts. The bank also ensures the borrower understands policy requirements, has commitment and capacity to manage adverse impacts, and that consultations with affected people are conducted in accordance with the safeguard requirements. Due diligence and review involve field visits and desk reviews. The bank helps the client in building capacity to deliver the safeguards, discloses project information on the website and conducts periodic site visits for projects with adverse environmental or social impacts. For projects with significant adverse social or environmental impacts, the bank will conduct supervision missions with detailed review by ADB’s safeguard specialists/officers or consultants. The bank also seeks corrective measures to ensure compliance with the policy requirements, and may exercise legal remedies if the borrower fails to re-establish compliance.
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AFDB)

SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS ON REPRISALS

In its updated Integrated Safeguards System (ISS),\textsuperscript{79} the AfDB states it is committed to “open dialogue, safe public consultation free of reprisal, timely and full access to information, and responsive grievance mechanisms.”\textsuperscript{80} It also includes a specific annex on addressing reprisal risks,\textsuperscript{81} stating that – when reprisal risks are identified – clients should “implement specific measures to prevent reprisals, such as using best practices in safe consultations, independent monitoring of project implementation, training, proactive community outreach, enhancing project-affected communities’ awareness of, ability to access independent grievance mechanisms, or other modifications to project design to mitigate the risks of reprisals.”\textsuperscript{82}

The annex, however, does not explain how reprisal risk assessment should be conducted and it places the responsibility for preventing and responding to reprisals exclusively on the client. With regards to the bank’s role, it only states that specific directives to staff will be issued on application of its commitment against reprisals.\textsuperscript{83}

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

In the ISS, the AfDB commits to ensure – at any time during the operations life cycle – protection of all stakeholders against reprisals.\textsuperscript{84} In particular, the ISS states that:

- the client should not retaliate against workers who participate or seek to participate in workers’ organizations and engage in collective bargaining;\textsuperscript{85}
- grievance mechanisms will allow for anonymous complaints to be raised and addressed;\textsuperscript{86}
- meaningful consultations with affected communities must be free of manipulation, interference, coercion, discrimination, intimidation and reprisal;\textsuperscript{87}
- Stakeholder Engagement Plans will include concrete measures to implement the borrower’s commitments to prevent reprisals.\textsuperscript{88}

In the ISS, the environmental and social assessments cover all relevant direct and indirect environmental and social risks and impacts,\textsuperscript{89} including socioeconomic and cultural, community social structure, gender, vulnerable groups, health, and safety among others. One of the OS applies to health, safety and security (OS 4), and contains

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\textsuperscript{79} The AFDB Integrated Safeguards System (ISS) was initially approved in 2013 and updated in April 2023. It now includes: a Policy Statement on “An African Vision of Sustainable Development” (ISS PS), ten Operational Safeguards (OS), the Environmental and Social Policy (ESP), and the Integrated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (IESIA). The 10 OS include OS 1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; OS 2: Labour and Working Conditions; OS 3: Resources Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management; OS 4: Community Health, Safety and Security; OS 5: Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Access to Land and Land Use, and Involuntary Resettlement; OS 6: Habitat and Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources; OS 7: Vulnerable Groups; OS 8: Cultural Heritage; OS 9: Financial Intermediaries; OS 10: Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure.

\textsuperscript{80} AfDB PS (par. 5).
\textsuperscript{81} AfDB ISS OS 10; Annex 2.
\textsuperscript{82} AfDB ISS ESP (par. 27).
\textsuperscript{83} AfDB OS 10 (par. 31).
\textsuperscript{84} AfDB OS 10, (par. 9).
\textsuperscript{85} AfDB ISS, OS 10 (par. 18).
\textsuperscript{86} AfDB OS 1 (par. 19, 24).
specific provisions related to the assessment of risks posed by the use of security personnel.

The policy also states that one of the different tools that can be used to undertake the environmental and social assessment is the contextual risk assessment, which gathers information on limitations to meaningful consultation and free speech, including the risks of reprisals to stakeholders. With this analysis, the client can assess whether these risks have the potential to distort stakeholder engagement, to exacerbate social inequality, and to compromise the intended benefits for project-affected people. However, contextual assessment is not mandatory. The policy also says that, in certain cases, this assessment can be carried out by the bank.

**Consultations**
The ISS places the responsibility for meaningful consultations and for ensuring informed consent for certain projects on the client, but the bank has the right to participate. In certain cases, when the environmental and social risks/impacts are high, the borrower may be required to retain independent third-party specialists. These experts could help assist in the stakeholder identification, support the design of an inclusive engagement process, and be required in some Social Engagement Plans to communicate with vulnerable groups.

When the projects affect vulnerable rural minorities, the safeguard OS7 states that the bank may seek the technical advice of specialists with expertise on social and cultural groups in the project area, and that the AfDB will consult both the affected communities and the borrower.

**Assessment of risks and impacts**
The client is responsible for the assessment of different risks and impacts of the projects. When environmental and social risks/impacts are significant, the bank will determine whether the borrower is required to retain independent third-party specialists, who will support the environmental and social due diligence on the project.

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MISPLACED TRUST

The bank’s role

The AfDB’s roles include:

- supporting the borrower;
- carrying out due diligence;
- monitoring the environmental and social performance by reviewing the reports prepared by the client and annual environmental and social audits prepared by independent consultants of the borrower, and during its own supervision missions;
- determining the project risk classification;
- disclosing environmental and social documentation prior to project appraisal;
- carrying out an assessment of gender issues for every project;
- issuing specific directives to bank staff on the protection of all stakeholders against reprisals, sexual exploitation, abuse, sexual harassment, and gender-based violence; or discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity;
- where the bank deems it necessary, it may undertake a contextual risk assessment to complement its environmental and social due diligence.

Involvement of independent specialists is required for high-risk projects, when the borrower has limited capacity, where FPIC is required in projects affecting highly vulnerable rural minorities, when offsets are proposed for adverse impacts on critical areas, and for dams. The client is responsible for monitoring the project implementation and reporting the information to the bank. Third-party resettlement professionals are required to monitor the implementation of resettlement plans for projects with large-scale, complex and/or significant involuntary resettlement impacts. For projects with significant involuntary resettlement, the borrower will commission an independent completion audit of the plan. Where appropriate, the bank will require the borrower to engage stakeholders and third parties, such as independent experts, local communities, CSOs or NGOs, to complement or verify the monitoring information. The borrower will facilitate site visits by AfDB staff or consultants acting on the bank’s behalf.

99 AfDB, OS 1 (par. 21). In addition, for high-risk or contentious projects, the borrower may also be required to engage one or more internationally recognized independent experts, who will provide independent advice and oversight to the project (OS 1, par. 29); and when structural elements of a project or activities are situated in high-risk locations and their malfunction may threaten the safety of communities, the Borrower will engage one or more independent experts with relevant and recognized experience in similar projects, separate from those responsible for the design and construction.

100 AfDB, OS 7 (par. 37).
101 AfDB, OS 6 (par. 10).
102 AfDB, OS 4, Annex 1 (par. 40, 43, 44, 45).
103 AfDB ESP, par 35, OS 1 (par. 2, 11, 12, 36, 40, 41, 42, 58, 59, 60); OS 2 (par. 45); OS 5 (par. 32).
104 AfDB, OS 5 (par. 32).
105 AfDB, OS 5 (par. 34).
106 AfDB, ESP (par. 71).
107 AfDB, OS 1 (par. 44).
108 AfDB ISS ESP (par. 2, 66); OS 1 (par. 26), OS 3 (par. 26).
109 AfDB, ISS ESP (par. 2, 63).
110 AfDB, ISS ESP (par. 15, 66); OS 1 (par. 2).
111 AfDB ISS ESP (par. 66).
112 AfDB, ISS, ESP (par. 29).
113 AfDB, ISS, ESP (par. 62).
114 AfDB, An African vision for sustainable development (par. 7).
115 AfDB, ESP (par. 12).

The new village of Bildak in Ethiopia’s Gambella region, which the semi-nomadic Nuer were forcibly transferred to and quickly abandoned. Credit: Human Rights Watch.
In January 2019, the EBRD published the statement “Retaliations Against Civil Society and Project Stakeholders”. It affirms that the EBRD does not tolerate reprisals by its clients or other project counter-parties and that the bank takes credible allegations seriously.

The statement refers to procedures used by the EBRD to address allegations of reprisals. An EBRD counterparty, that is suspected to have engaged in a coercive practice such as reprisal under the bank’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures (EPPs), can be subject to enforcement proceedings. For all the other cases, the EBRD affirms it works with clients and other relevant parties to try to address reprisals.

In the statement, the bank commits to raise the issue directly with the client or relevant party, to make EBRD’s position against reprisals clear, and take follow-up action as and where appropriate. It also states that locally affected communities should be able to raise their concerns, without fearing reprisals, through project-level grievance mechanisms or the Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM), which has since been renamed EBRD’s Independent Project Accountability Mechanism (IPAM). The statement also mentions internal guidelines on the handling of allegations of retaliation for criticism and complaints related to EBRD projects, but these documents – as they are not public – have not been included in this analysis.

**ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY**

**Reprisals**

EBRD’s Environmental and Social Policy (ESP) requires the identification and management of all relevant direct/indirect environmental and social risks/impacts of the projects. It also recognizes that, in certain cases, it may be appropriate to complement these assessments with further studies focusing on specific risks and impacts, such as human rights. One of the performance requirements applies to health, safety and security risks (PR 4), risks that should be part of a more comprehensive assessment of reprisal risks.

The policy mentions retaliations in three instances, stating that:

- meaningful consultations in the context of the projects must be free from manipulation, coercion, intimidation, and retaliation;

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119 EBRD ESP PR 1 (par. 12)
120 EBRD ESP (par. 2.4); PR1 (par 12).
121 EBRD ESP (par. 7)
the client should not retaliate against workers who participate in workers’ organizations;\(^{122}\)
and in relation to grievance mechanisms.\(^{123}\)

**Consultations**

In March 2023, the EBRD published the Guidance Notes for the Performance Requirement 10,\(^{124}\) which mentions good practices that clients should adopt to avoid retaliation, but without any procedure or mechanism specifically aimed at assessing reprisal risks and preventing reprisals.\(^{125}\) The policy places the responsibility for meaningful consultations on the client.\(^{126}\) It establishes that, in some cases, the bank may conduct its own public consultation activities to gauge stakeholder views,\(^{127}\) without specifying the conditions under which the bank will conduct them. Even though it is not stated in the policy, the bank affirms in all “category A” and “high risk category B projects”, bank staff would interview key stakeholders during the due diligence process and also check “reputable” CSO reports.

When FPIC is required, the client must retain qualified independent experts to assist in conducting and documenting the good faith negotiations and FPIC process.\(^{128}\) The policy does not specify the criteria applied to determine when an expert is independent. Since the expert will be selected and hired by the client, independence from the borrower is not ensured.

**Assessment of risks and impacts**

The client is responsible for carrying out an assessment of risks and impacts.\(^{129}\) For example, the client is required to assess and identify project security threats for workers and communities,\(^{130}\) including the risks posed by its own security arrangements and those of its contractors.\(^{131}\) The client must also verify its workers providing security services have not been implicated in past abuses,\(^{132}\) and assess potential risks arising from public security forces.\(^{133}\)

For projects that are complex or contentious, or that involve potentially significant multidimensional environmental and social risks or impacts, the client may be required to engage one or more internationally recognized independent experts. Such experts may form part of an advisory panel or be employed by the client, and will provide independent advice and oversight to the project.\(^{134}\) This is discretionary for the bank, and the policy does not establish specific conditions to ensure actual independence from the client. The client is required to commission an objective and independent study to identify all communities of Indigenous Peoples who may be affected by the project, and – in consultation with them – assess the potential effects of the project on these groups and their views about the project.\(^{135}\) Independent experts are also required when the project could have adverse impacts on a critical habitat.\(^{136}\)

The client is also responsible for monitoring the project implementation.\(^{137}\) For projects that could have significant adverse environmental and social risks and impacts, the bank may require the client to engage relevant external experts to perform independent reviews of the project or to monitor specific environmental and social risks and impacts.\(^{138}\) Independent reviews are not mandatory but rather discretionally demanded by the EBRD, since the policy does not indicate the criteria to require them. The independence of the experts is also not guaranteed since the client is responsible for engaging them.

**The bank’s role**

During project appraisal and monitoring, the bank reviews the client’s information, provides guidance to assist the client in addressing environmental and social impacts, as well as to help identify opportunities for environmental or social benefits.\(^{139}\) The EBRD may also periodically verify the monitoring information produced by the clients, through site visits by its environmental and social specialists or independent experts.\(^{140}\) This is a discretionary power since the provision does not establish any criteria to determine its application.

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122 EBRD ESP PR 10 (par. 7 and 20); PR 2 (par. 15).
123 EBRD ESP PR 2 (par. 21); PR 10 (par. 29).
125 During meetings with civil society organizations, the bank’s staff informed them about the existence of internal guidelines and procedures aimed at assessing reprisal risks. Since these documents are not published, they cannot be included in this analysis.
126 EBRD ESP (par. 2.9, 4.13); PR10 (par. 19–21); PR 1 (par. 8); PR 5 (par. 16, 36, 37, 38, 39); PR 6 (par.12, 15); PR 8 (par. 9, 10).
127 EBRD ESP (par. 4.13).
128 EBRD ESP PR 7 (par.15).
129 EBRD ESP (par. 4.8, 2.9, 4.13); PR 1 (par. 2, 4, 7); PR 2 (par. 22, 23, 25); PR 3 (par. 5, 10, 21); PR 4 (par. 16, 18, 26, 30, 32, 39, 41, 42); PR 5 (par. 9, 20, 21, 22); PR 6 (par. 5, 7, 8, 17); PR 7 (par. 1, 7, 8, 9); PR 8 (par. 11).
130 EBRD ESP PR 4 (par. 39).
131 EBRD ESP PR 4 (par. 40).
132 EBRD ESP PR 4 (par. 42).
133 EBRD ESP PR 4 (par. 41).
134 EBRD ESP PR 1 (par. 13).
135 EBRD ESP PR 7 (par. 9).
136 EBRD ESP PR 6 (par. 17, 19).
137 EBRD ESP PR 1 (par. 12, 15).
138 EBRD ESP PR 1 (par. 35).
139 EBRD ESP (par. 4.7 - 4.14, 4.18).
140 EBRD ESP (par. 4.18).
In 2020, the EIB published a Guidance Note for the EIB Standard on Stakeholder Engagement in EIB Operations, that includes guidance for project promoters on how they should address reprisal risks. The guidance also requires project promoters to share allegations of reprisal with the EIB, subject to the consent of the affected individual, and states that the bank may take follow-up action. However, it does not explain how the bank will assess and manage reprisal risks.

Reprisals

The Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework (ESSF), approved in 2022, consists of an Environmental and Social Policy (ESP) and Environmental and Social Standards (ESS). The ESP states that the bank does not tolerate reprisals. The ESS requires project promoters to provide information related to context-specific social risks, including risks of reprisals, in order to determine the need for an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA), and recommends the inclusion of that information on the ESIA report. The assessment of social aspects includes considerations of potential human rights risks, including the right to freedom of assembly and association. When preparing stakeholder engagement, the promoter must consider the country context and the public debate about the project and the sector, take into account any risks of reprisals, and identify groups at risk.

If risks of reprisals are identified, the engagement plan — “as deemed necessary by the EIB” — shall include a strategy for preventing and responding to reprisals, in particular by engaging constructively with those at risk. The plan includes requirements related to the assessment and prevention of risks created by private and public security forces. The stakeholder engagement plan has to provide secure fora for consulting these groups and ensuring reprisal-sensitive stakeholder engagement. If the project is located in fragile or conflict-affected areas,
or with a high incidence of human rights violations, or is implemented during a crisis that could impact consultations, the client must develop targeted consultations to ensure a safe space for stakeholders.151 Project promoters have to offer protection against intimidation during consultations,152 and must ensure grievance mechanisms are free of reprisals.153

Although the policy requires the assessment of retaliation risks and the adoption of preventive measures, the responsibility for this assessment and for the corresponding preventative strategy is attributed exclusively to the client. The policy does not regulate how the bank will assess reprisal risks, and prevent and respond to reprisals potentially carried out by their own clients.

Responsibilities for consultations
The client is responsible for stakeholder engagement with project-affected people and for obtaining FPIC of project-affected Indigenous Peoples.154 When seeking funding for projects that have already started, and the client cannot demonstrate it has sought and acted upon the opinions of project-affected Indigenous Peoples, the requirement is for the client to 155 carry out or commission an independent assessment156. Since this evaluation can be carried out by the client, independence is not guaranteed. No other provision requires the direct involvement of bank staff or independent third parties. Some provisions require the involvement of specialists, but don’t require them to be independent from the client.156 In order to monitor the consultations, the client is only advised to implement, whenever feasible, monitoring by third parties.157

Assessment of risks and impacts
The assessment of risks and impacts of the project is attributed to the client.158 For projects that are in an initial design stage, the client has to undertake or commission an independent study by specialists to identify Indigenous Peoples, assess potential impacts, and gather their views about the project.159

Where significant labour-associated risks have been identified, the promoter has to commission an independent Labour Assessment or Labour Audit.160 Monitoring is also a responsibility of the client,161 that may engage stakeholders and/or third parties (such as independent experts, local communities or NGOs) but this is not a requirement.162 If major accidents occur, the bank may require an independent investigation.163

The bank’s role
The EIB is responsible for conducting due diligence, monitoring and reviewing compliance with requirements based on the information provided by the

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151 EIB ESS 2 (par. 39).
152 EIB ESS 7 (par. 25); ESS 9 (par. 31).
153 EIB ESS 2 (par. 23, 25); ESS 9 (par. 61); ESS 8 (par. 44).
154 EIB ESS 1 (par. 8); ESS 2 (par. 3, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 27, 32, 37, 39, 44); ESS 4 (par. 28); ESS 6 (par. 43, 44, 45, 50); ESS 7 (par. 25, 26, 27, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 53); ESS 8 (par. 41); ESS 9 (par. 35, 60); ESS 10 (par. 20, 21).
155 ESS 7 (par. 39).
156 EIB ESS 7 (par. 33, 36, 46).
157 EIB ESS 2 (par. 42).
158 EIB ESS 1 (par. 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 21, 23); ESS 4 (par. 5, 9, 10, 11, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 40); ESS 5 (par. 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21); ESS 6 (par. 19, 26); ESS 7 (par. 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31, 35, 36); ESS 8 (par. 9, 31, 47, 48, 52, 56); ESS 9 (par. 5, 14, 19, 27, 31, 35, 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 55, 68); ESS 10 (par. 3, 11, 13, 15, 19, 20).
159 EIB ESS 7 (par. 36).
160 EIB ESS 8 (par. 48).
161 EIB ESS 8 (par. 48).
162 EIB ESS 1 (par. 27); ESS 7 (par. 29, 59).
163 ESS 9 (par. 65).
client and other available information. Due diligence may include:
- analyzing the country’s context and contextual risks (including those related to human rights);
- reviewing the information provided by the client and requesting additional information;
- reviewing other available information (including local sources of knowledge related to environmental, climate and social impacts);
- categorizing projects;
- conducting site visits and engaging with the client’s staff and relevant stakeholders (including potentially affected communities);
- ensuring the findings are reflected in the application of the mitigation hierarchy;
- assessing the capacity and commitment of the client to implement the project in accordance with the policy;
- providing technical assistance or advisory support.

The responsibility for assessing and preventing reprisals is put jointly on the IDB, the borrowers, and executing agencies. In order to prevent reprisals, it also highlights the importance of the IDB conducting additional stakeholder engagement without the involvement of the borrower in high-risk contexts, and identifies certain specific circumstances that can be considered as red flags that determine the need to conduct IDB-led consultations. It also considers the possibility of requesting the support of independent third parties to defuse tensions and reduce the likelihood that reprisals materialize.

SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS ON REPRISALS

In 2022, the IDB adopted a technical note on Repraisal Risk Management to support its staff, borrowers, and executing agencies to assess retaliation risks, prevent and respond to reprisals. Among the potential sources of retaliations, the note identifies: state agencies at central and local levels, executing agencies, business partners, non-state armed groups, media, and other community members. It also lists some of the key contextual risk factors to be identified during the initial screening of projects, such as: restrictions on civic space, the track record of the project implementers, past instances of retaliations in the area, conflicts or tensions in the community, and the presence of marginalized groups among others. The technical note also suggests some relevant independent sources of information, including national and international civil society organizations, affected communities, national human rights institutions, and regional and international human rights mechanisms and procedures. This initial screening of the projects has the objective of identifying retaliation risks, their potential perpetrators, and their victims, informing IDB’s risk categorization, and how to carry out consultations.
The technical note is an important tool in the prevention and response to retaliation, as it details some of the key steps that must be taken for risk assessment and the prevention of retaliations, identifies the executing agencies as potential sources of retaliation, requires a contextual assessment, includes sources of information independent of the client and makes the bank responsible for the evaluation of these risks.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

Reprisals

The Environmental and Social Policy Framework (ESPF), approved in 2020, states that the bank does not tolerate retaliation, such as threats, intimidation, harassment, or violence, against those who voice their opinion or opposition to an IDB-financed project or to the borrower, and states the client should not retaliate against workers who participate, or seek to participate, in workers’ organizations and collective bargaining. It states the IDB takes any credible allegations of reprisals seriously, and when complaints are raised, the bank works to address them with the involved parties, raising its concerns directly to the borrower or relevant party and taking follow-up action. The policy also states that meaningful consultations and stakeholder engagement must be free of reprisals and requires grievance mechanisms to ensure people can raise complaints free of reprisals.

The assessment of risks and impacts includes those related to human rights, considers all relevant environmental and social risks and impacts, including those related to community safety and threats to human security through the risk of escalation of personal or communal conflict and violence, and risks related to conflict or contestation over land and natural resources. The policy also

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173 IDB PS (par. 7.2).
174 IDB PS (par. 7.2).
175 IDB PS (par. 1.3); ESS 1 (par. 32, 33); ESS 10 (par. 21, 22).
176 IDB ESS 10 (par. 28); ESS 1 (par. 39); ESS 2 (par. 22).
177 IDB ESS 1 (par. 6).
178 IDB ESS 1 (par. 9).
179 IDB ESS 1 (par. 9 vi); ESS 4 (par. 5).
180 IDB ESS 1 (par. 9 vii).
contains specific provisions related to the assessment of risks posed by the use of security personnel.\textsuperscript{181}

The policy does not regulate how the bank will assess reprisal risks and how it will prevent those risks, but its application is complemented by a guidance note that establishes some procedures and steps related to addressing reprisals.

**Consultations**

The client is responsible for stakeholder engagement with people affected by the project, and for obtaining FPIC of Indigenous communities when it is required.\textsuperscript{182} Depending on the potential significance of the risks and impacts, the client may be required to retain third-party specialists to assist in stakeholder identification and analysis.\textsuperscript{183} The policy does not establish the circumstances under which it is necessary to involve third-party specialists, nor does it specify how to ensure they are independent from the client.

**Assessment of risks and impacts**

The assessment of risks and impacts of the project is attributed to the client.\textsuperscript{184} The clients may be required to involve external experts to assist in the risks and impacts identification and monitoring processes, throughout the project’s lifecycle.\textsuperscript{185} The engagement of external experts is also required when the client is considering the development of an offset,\textsuperscript{186} when FPIC of indigenous communities is required, and to assist in the assessment and protection of critical cultural heritage.\textsuperscript{187}

The client must also engage external experts, separate from those responsible for the design and construction, in order to conduct a review when structural components of the project are situated in high-risk locations and their failure or malfunction may threaten the safety of communities.\textsuperscript{188}

For some projects that involve involuntary resettlement, depending on the scale and complexity of physical and economic displacement, the borrower has to commission an external completion audit of the Resettlement Action Plan or Livelihood Restoration Plan.\textsuperscript{189} When projects are implemented in areas of critical habitats, in a legally protected area, or an internationally recognized area, the borrower should retain external experts to assist in the development of a mitigation plan.\textsuperscript{190} The policy does not clarify which process or rules must be followed in order to ensure the experts are independent of the client.

Clients are also responsible for project monitoring.\textsuperscript{191} For projects with significant impacts, the borrower has to retain external experts to verify its monitoring information.\textsuperscript{192} The IDB may require the client to engage stakeholders and third parties, such as independent experts, local communities, or civil society organizations, to complement or verify project monitoring information.\textsuperscript{193}

**The bank’s role**

The IDB is responsible for:

- carrying out its own environmental and social due diligence, in accordance with the standards of the ESPF and the Environmental and Social Review Procedures.
- reviewing the information provided by the client;
- providing technical assistance and guidance to the client to fulfill the ESPF’s requirements;\textsuperscript{194}
- requesting additional information where there are gaps;\textsuperscript{195}
- monitoring the environmental and social performance of the project;\textsuperscript{196}
- assigning the social risk classification and disclosing the environmental and social documentation produced by the client and the bank.\textsuperscript{197}

If clients do not comply with the policies, the IDB should work with them to achieve compliance, and may provide additional technical assistance and increased monitoring by the bank and/or stakeholders and third parties.\textsuperscript{198} When FPIC of Indigenous Peoples is required, the IDB has to assess the outcomes of the meaningful consultations; if FPIC cannot be verified, the bank should not proceed further. The IDB can also consider adopting additional measures in its due diligence process, to obtain the information required for its decision-making processes.

\textsuperscript{181} IDB ESS 4 (par. 15, 16, 17).
\textsuperscript{182} IDB PS (par. 1.3, 7, 13); ESS1 (par. 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37); ESS 5 (par. 10); ESS 6 (par. 19); ESS 7 (par. 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20, 26); ESS 8 (par. 9, 15, 16); ESS 9 (par. 17, 20); ESS 10 (par. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29).
\textsuperscript{183} IDB ESS 10 (par. 12).
\textsuperscript{184} IDB PS (par. 1.3, 2.2, 3.5, 3.18); ESS 1 (par. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 21); ESS 2 (par. 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37); ESS 3 (par. 8, 10, 11, 13); ESS 4 (par. 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16); ESS 6 (par. 6, 21, 23); ESS 7 (par. 7, 9, 12, 18, 26); ESS 8 (par. 2, 6, 7, 8); ESS 9 (par. 11, 13, 18, 21).
\textsuperscript{185} IDB ESS 1 (par. 21).
\textsuperscript{186} IDB ESS 6 (par. 10).
\textsuperscript{187} IDB ESS 7 (par. 16-21); ESS 7 (par. 14); ESS 8 (14).
\textsuperscript{188} IDB ESS 4 (par. 7).
\textsuperscript{189} IDB ESS 4 (par. 15).
\textsuperscript{190} IDB ESS 6 (par. 8).
\textsuperscript{191} IDB PS (par. 3.8, 3.9); ESS 1 (par. 5, 21, 24, 26); ESS 2 (par. 31, 34); ESS 3 (par. 13); ESS 4 (par. 7); ESS 5 (par. 14, 15).
\textsuperscript{192} IDB ESS1 (par. 24).
\textsuperscript{193} IDB PS (par. 3.8).
\textsuperscript{194} IDB PS (par. 1.5, 3.1, 3.14, 3.15).
\textsuperscript{195} IDB PS (par. 3.13).
\textsuperscript{196} IDB PS (par. 3.20).
\textsuperscript{197} IDB PS (par. 3.13).
\textsuperscript{198} IDB PS (par. 3.20).
MISPLACED TRUST

SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS ON REPRISALS

In 2021, IDB Invest issued a Good Practice Note in collaboration with IFC,199 to provide practical guidance to companies on how to address risks of retaliation against project stakeholders and respond to reported incidents. The guide does not establish any steps the banks themselves must take to address these risks, even though it mentions that company representatives and partners can be among the potential perpetrators of retaliation.200 In relation to the role of the banks, it only states that they seek to prevent reprisals through the identification of risks, in their due diligence processes, and in the engagement with their clients and partners on environmental and social risk management for their projects.201

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

Reprisals

In 2020, IDB Invest adopted an Environmental and Social Sustainability Policy (ESSP).202 In addition, the bank applies the Performance Standards (PS) on the Environmental and Social Sustainability of the IFC (see further details in the section below).203

The ESSP states that meaningful stakeholder engagement must be free of intimidation or coercion,204 and that IDB Invest does not tolerate retaliation (such as threats, intimidation, harassment, or violence) against those who voice their opinion or opposition to its projects.205 It says the client cannot retaliate against workers who participate, or seek to participate, in workers’ organizations and collective bargaining,206 or against those who raise concerns through the grievance mechanisms.207 It also affirms that the bank takes any credible allegations of reprisals seriously and aims to address them, raising concerns directly with the client and/or other relevant party, and that it takes follow-up action when necessary.208

The assessment of risks and impacts includes environmental, social, and human rights aspects,209 including those related to community safety (e.g. escalation of personal or communal conflict, and violence or contestation over land and natural resources).210 The policy also contains specific provisions related to the assessment of risks posed by the use of security personnel.211

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200 IDB Invest & IFC GPN (p. 9).
201 IDB Invest & IFC GPN (pp 6, 7).
204 IDB Invest ESSP (par. 18); IFC PS 1 (par 30).
205 IFC ESP (par. 20).
206 IFC PS 2 (par. 14).
207 IFC PS 2 (par. 20).
208 IDB Invest ESSP (par. 20). IDB Invest’s Implementation Manual additionally states that the project analysis and engagement should be cognizant of reprisal risks, and mentions different measures that may be taken, such as risk assessment and prevention at early stages of the project, incorporation of reprisal risks in the environmental and social assessment process, including through systematic analysis of contextual risk, and involving those at risk. (par. 4.6)
209 IDB Invest ESSP 1 (par. 6, 9).
210 IDB Invest ESSP 1 (par. 9 vi, viii); ESS 4 (par. 5).
211 IDB Invest ESSP (par.17); IFC PS 1 (par. 3. 7), PS 4 (par. 2).
One of the performance standards applies to health, safety and security risks, and requires the assessment of some risks that should be part of a reprisal risk assessment, such as risks posed by the use of security personnel, including government security forces. Despite its explicit commitments against retaliations, the policy does not establish a detailed process for comprehensively assessing retaliation risks, or for preventing and responding to retaliations.

**Responsibilities for consultations**

The client is responsible for consulting potentially affected stakeholders.

Even though it is not explicit in the policy, IDB Invest affirms it requires an independent environmental and social consultant (IESC) to assist in the environmental and social due diligence and supervision of category A and most high risk category B projects. The IESC is chosen and paid by the client but must be deemed acceptable and report to IDB Invest.

**Assessment of risks and impacts**

The policy places the responsibility for the assessment of project risks on the client. For projects with potentially significant adverse impacts or that involve technically complex issues, IDB Invest requires the application of IFC standards (see IFC section below).

The bank’s role

IDB Invest conducts due diligence of proposed direct investments; when there are significant environmental or social impacts associated with the project, the bank works with its client to determine possible remediation measures.

Environmental and social due diligence for direct investments include:

- a review of available information, records, and documentation, including local sources of knowledge related to the environmental and social risks and impacts;
- environmental and social risk categorization of the project;
- requesting additional information when gaps are identified;
- contextual risk assessment through a review of informed consultation, participation, and FPIC conducted by the client;
- conducting a site visit and interviews with client’s staff and stakeholders, including potentially affected communities;
- monitoring the client’s community engagement during implementation and evaluation of the environmental and social management plans and performance;
- development of an Environmental and Social Action Plan;
- disclosure of the project information on the website;
- a gender risk screening assessment for investments with potential disproportionate gender-based risks and impacts;
- screening and assessment of climate-related risks that may affect its investments, particularly for areas highly prone to disasters;
- revision of the client’s monitoring reports and updates on the environmental and social commitments, taking into account information from third parties (including affected communities, stakeholders and other relevant organizations).
In 2018, IFC adopted a Position Statement on Retaliation Against Civil Society and Project Stakeholders, stating it does not tolerate any action by a client that amounts to retaliation – including threats, intimidation, harassment, or violence – against those who voice their opinion regarding the activities of IFC or its clients. In this statement, the bank explicitly references retaliation perpetrated by its clients. The bank also affirms it takes any credible allegations of reprisals seriously. When complaints about reprisals are raised, the bank works with the clients or appropriate parties to try to address them, by raising concerns directly with the client or relevant party, making clear the bank’s position against reprisals, and taking follow-up action where appropriate. In addition to environmental and social requirements related to risk identification, stakeholder engagement, and complaint mechanisms, the bank states it is working on internal protocols and staff guidance to raise awareness and guide action, including integrating these concerns in their contextual risk screening procedures to identify contexts that are high-risk for retaliation and violence.

In 2020, IFC published a Tip Sheet for clients to prevent reprisals during the pandemic, providing practical advice to minimize risks and flag specific issues that could be exacerbated in the context of COVID-19. The Tip Sheet mentions the previous Position Statement, but no additional reference is made to the actions the bank adopted to assess the increased reprisal risks, and to prevent and respond to reprisals in the context of the pandemic.

In 2021, IFC published a “Good Practice Note for the Private Sector, Addressing the Risks of Retaliation Against Project Stakeholders”, in collaboration with the IDB Invest (see section above).
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

Reprisals
In 2012, the IFC adopted its Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, applied in conjunction with IFC’s Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability.

According to IFC’s Performance Standards, meaningful stakeholder engagement must be free of external manipulation, interference, coercion, or intimidation. This policy also states that clients cannot retaliate against workers who participate, or seek to participate, in workers’ organizations and collective bargaining, or against those who raise concerns through the grievance mechanisms.

The risk assessment includes potential human rights, environmental and social risks and impacts. One of the performance standards applies to health, safety and security risks and requires the assessment of some risks that should be part of a reprisal risk assessment, such as those posed by the use of security personnel, including government security forces. Despite its explicit commitments against retaliations, the policy does not establish a detailed process for comprehensively assessing retaliation risks or preventing and responding to retaliation.

Responsibilities for consultations
The client is responsible for consulting potentially affected stakeholders. When FPIC is required, the client must engage external experts to assist in identifying the project risks and impacts. According to IFC’s environmental and social review procedures manual they are experts appointed by the client to assist with its assessments or other tasks, or by the bank to help with its review or supervision activities. This means they may be directly appointed or hired by the client.

Assessment of risks and impacts
The policy places the responsibility for the assessment of project risks on the client. For projects with potentially significant adverse impacts or involving technically complex issues, clients may be required to involve external experts to assist in the identification process of risks and impacts. This requirement is discretionary, and the policy does not clarify how to assess the independence of the experts.

The client must retain external experts to assist in assessing and protecting critical cultural heritage. When structural elements or components are located in high-risk areas, and their malfunction may threaten the safety of communities, the client will also engage external experts with relevant and recognized experience in similar projects, separate from those responsible for the design and construction, to conduct a review as early as possible and throughout all the stages of the project.

The client is also responsible for monitoring the project. For projects with significant impacts, the client will retain external experts to verify its monitoring information (for example, when the project involves a resettlement plan, livelihood restoration, critical habitats, biodiversity offsets, and production of living natural resources).

The bank’s role
IFC conducts due diligence on the level and quality of the risks and impacts identification process, carried out by its clients, against the requirements of the Performance Standards. Environmental and social due diligence on direct investments typically includes reviewing available information, records, and documentation related to the environmental and social risks and impacts; site inspections and interviews of client personnel and relevant stakeholders, where appropriate; analyzing the environmental and social performance of the project; identifying gaps and additional measures and actions needed to ensure the project meets the Performance Standards.

IFC monitors the client’s community engagement process. For projects with potentially significant adverse impacts on communities or potentially adverse impacts on Indigenous Peoples, the bank


229 IFC PS 1 (par. 30).
230 IFC PS 2 (par. 14).
231 IFC PS 2 (par. 20).
232 IFC PS 1 (par. 3, 7), PS 4 (par. 2), PS 1 (par. 7).
233 IFC PS 1 (par. 12-14).
234 IFC ESSP (par. 31); IFC PS 1 (par. 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33); PS 5 (par. 10); PS 6 (par. 14, 20); PS 7 (par. 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17); PS 8 (par. 9, 14, 15).
235 IFC PS 1 (par. 11).
236 IFC’s environmental and social review procedures manual, Key terms and acronyms. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics, Ext. Content/IFC External

237 IFC PS 1 (par. 6, 7, 9, 12); PS 2 (par. 21, 23); PS 2 (par. 27); PS 3 (par. 11); PS 4 (par. 5, 6, 8); PS 4 (par. 12, 13); PS 532, PS 6 (par. 6, 8, 22, 24, 28); PS 7 (par. 8, 7, 22), PS 8 (par. 2, 6, 7, 8).
238 IFC PS 1 (par. 19).
240 IFC PS 6 (par. 14).
241 IFC PS 4 (par. 6).
242 IFC PS 1 (par. 22, 23); PS 2 (par. 25, 27); PS 3 (par. 8, 12); PS 5 (par. 14, 30); PS 6 (par. 17); PS 6 (par. 30); PS 7 (par. 21).
243 IFC ESSP (par. 12).
244 IFC ESSP (par. 28).
245 IFC ESSP (par. 30).
will determine through its own investigation if the client’s community engagement involves informed consultation and participation,\(^\text{245}\) and leads to “broad community support” for the project.\(^\text{246}\) When FPIC is required, the bank undertakes an in-depth review of the process conducted by the client.\(^\text{247}\)

To monitor its direct investments, the IFC reviews the information reported by the client and the updates on the environmental and social action plan, identifies opportunities for improvement, addresses adverse impacts caused by changes in the circumstances, and works with the client to achieve compliance.\(^\text{248}\) When the IFC invests in extractive industries, it assesses the governance risks to expected benefits, promotes transparency of revenue payments to host governments, and requires that clients publicly disclose their payments.\(^\text{249}\)
SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS ON REPRISALS

In March 2020, the WB adopted a statement on zero tolerance for reprisals against those who share their views about bank-financed projects, stating that “any form of intimidation against people who comment on Bank projects, research, activities and their impact, goes against our core values of respecting the people we work for and acting with utmost integrity”. The statement refers to the bank’s commitments against reprisals contained in its environmental and social policies and supporting guidance, as well as in other policies. However, none of these policies establishes specific protocols to regulate how due diligence is applied to assess and mitigate reprisal risks, or how the bank will act to prevent and address reprisals.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

Reprisals
The Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) requires the identification and prevention of all social and environmental risks generated by the projects, and establishes that consultations with interested parties and grievance mechanisms must be free of coercion and intimidation. However, the policy does not establish any procedure aimed at assessing reprisal risks in the context of the projects, as well as procedures to prevent and respond to reprisals.

Consultations
The ESF places the responsibility for meaningful consultations on the borrower. The direct consultation of the WB with affected people is only required to determine the applicability of safeguards related to Indigenous Peoples and Sub-Saharan African historically underserved traditional local communities. The bank can – at its own discretion – decide to support the borrower as and when required, to carry out engagement and meaningful consultations, and participate in consultations to understand and address the concerns of project-affected people.

251 In addition to the ESF, other specific documents and policies mentioned in the statement are the Environmental and Social Framework Directive on Addressing Risks and Impacts on Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Individuals or Groups, the Standard Procurement Documents, the Grievance Redress Service, and the Inspection Panel and its Guidelines to Reduce Retaliation Risks and Respond to Retaliation During the Panel Process. The Good Practice Note on Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment in Investment Project Financing Involving Major Civil Works is also mentioned, but only in relation to grievance mechanisms.
253 WB ESP (par 4.b); ESS1 (par. 28, Annex 2); ESS 4 (par. 2, 24-27).
254 WB ESP 10 (par. 7, 10, 22).
255 WB ESP 10 (par. 27), ESS 2 (par. 22).
256 WB ESP 10 (par.7); ESP (par. 53).
257 WB ESP (par. 54).
258 WB ESP (par 3.b, 53).
The policy also considers the possibility of requiring the borrower to retain independent third-party specialists, to assist in stakeholder identification and to support designing an inclusive engagement process, depending on the potential significance of environmental and social risks and impacts. However, the policy does not establish rules to ensure the independence of third-party specialists.

**Assessment of risks and impacts**

The assessment of different risks and impacts of the projects is a responsibility attributed to the client. Depending on the potential significance of environmental and social risks and impacts, the bank determines whether the borrower will be required to retain independent third-party specialists to assist in assessing environmental and social impacts. For high and substantial risk projects, and when the borrower has limited capacity, the borrower will retain independent specialists to carry out the environmental and social assessment. The engagement of independent experts by the borrower is also required in other specific situations. The policy adds that the borrower must take measures to ensure any conflict of interest is avoided, and the assessment will not be done by the consultants who prepare the engineering design, unless the borrower can demonstrate that no conflict of interest exists and such consultants include qualified environmental and social specialists. Since these specialists will be selected and hired by the client, who is also defining the scope of their work, there is a high risk their assessments will not be independent and comprehensive. Assistance by the bank is only contemplated in some specific cases.

The client is also responsible for monitoring the project implementation and reporting that information to the bank. The bank will require the borrower to engage stakeholders and third parties such as independent experts, local communities or NGOs to complement or verify project monitoring information, where appropriate and as set out in the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP). The bank can carry out field visits as part of the monitoring, facilitated by the client.

**The bank’s role**

The bank has the responsibility to review the assessment of the risks and impacts of the projects, based on the information produced and provided by the client at the different stages of the project, and can also request additional information if gaps are identified. In addition, banks are responsible for assessing risks inherent to the type of project and the specific context in which it will be developed and implemented, the capacity and commitment of the borrower to develop and implement the project in accordance with the ESS, and the significance of the gaps in information.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Why development banks should not rely on their clients to address reprisal risks

Damagat–Remontados Indigenous people protesting against the Kaliwa Dam in the Philippines. Credit: Stop Kaliwa dam coalition.
As indicated in this report, DFIs’ clients are often directly responsible for the reprisals occurring in the context of their projects and have incentives to avoid disclosing information related to reprisals. Implementing zero tolerance for reprisals requires DFIs to stop entrusting their clients with reprisal risk assessment and response, unless the clients have actively worked with directly affected communities and defenders to earn their trust first. DFIs cannot uncritically delegate reprisal risk assessment and response to clients.

Instead, DFIs should develop protocols and guidelines for what they will do themselves on reprisal issues. These protocols and guidelines must cover the entire project cycle and should be prepared in close consultations with those who have directly experienced reprisals in the context of development projects, as well as with the wider community and their allies, including CSOs specializing in human rights issues.

Under these protocols and guidelines, DFI should:

1. Assess reprisal risks and respond when reprisals occur
   a. Carry out an initial reprisal risk assessment, related to contexts and clients, through reprisal-sensitive consultations with communities directly affected by the project or policy. This assessment should precede any further steps on the project.
   b. Continue to independently assess reprisal risks related to contexts and clients, on an ongoing basis throughout the project lifecycle, as part of holistic human rights due diligence. Communities must be given the opportunity to actively and safely participate in this ongoing monitoring of the project.
   c. Take the lead: if there are allegations of reprisals, work directly with the person or peoples facing reprisals in a reprisal-sensitive manner to respond to reprisals.

2. Strengthen capacity and incentives of bank staff, management and consultants to prevent and respond to reprisals
   a. Strengthen internal capacity to provide oversight and supervision for the implementation of environmental and social safeguards.
   b. Invest in staff capacity to independently verify information from clients to assess reprisal risks and develop protocols to respond to reprisals independently from clients. For higher risk contexts, this should include reprisal-sensitive field visits in the project preparation phase, where the banks can engage directly with communities, independently from the client.
   c. Align incentives of staff, management and consultants to avoid reprisal risks, including implementing concrete adverse consequences for inadequate due diligence or failure to respond to cases of reprisals.
   d. Build in-house capacity on reprisal prevention and response, and maintain a roster of independent experts on reprisal prevention and response, ensuring they adhere to specific guidelines to avoid conflicts of interest.

3. Align client incentives (including by implementing negative consequences) to avoid reprisal risks and respond when reprisals occur
   a. Require clients to provide greater information transparency and disclosure around reprisal risks and cases of reprisals.
   b. Align client incentives and develop capacity to prevent reprisals and support a human rights-based response to cases of reprisals.
   c. Develop consequences for clients who withhold information about reprisal risks, fail to act in good faith in response to allegations of reprisals, or actively suppress dissent. Consequences can include higher borrowing costs, blacklisting, remedy framework, etc.

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272 A more comprehensive list of recommendations for DFIs, related to the assessment of reprisal risks and the prevention and response to reprisals in the context of development projects, can be found in the reports this analysis is based on: Uncalculated Risks (2019), Unhealthy Silence (2021) and Wearing Blinders (2022).

273 For more information on HRDD to avoid reprisal risks please see the recommendations in the report “Wearing Blinders”.
1 Seek out dissenting voices and ensure that stakeholder mapping exercises explicitly identify defenders or those at risk of reprisal.
2 Ensure adequate conditions for the participation of women, Indigenous, and other defenders and at-risk groups free from intimidation or coercion as a prerequisite for investment, allowing defenders and marginalized groups to establish the appropriate mode of engagement for their confidential, safe and effective participation.
3 Ensure and verify that affected communities have access to information in languages and format understandable to them, and in a timeframe that allows them to meaningfully engage and shape decision-making.
4 Require and independently verify that projects have secured and maintain the free, prior and informed consent of the concerned Indigenous Peoples and other rights-holders.
5 In communications with staff, project partners, authorities, and the public, make clear that those who raise concerns about a project have a right to be heard, avoid stigmatization or negative labels such as “project opponents” and take every opportunity to reaffirm the important role that defenders play in sustainable, inclusive development.
6 Address power imbalances and support affected communities’ capacity to meaningfully engage in development processes and defend their rights.
7 Provide strong oversight and specific guidance and capacity building for both clients and staff regarding how to conduct and verify reprisal-sensitive stakeholder engagement, especially in restricted contexts.
## ANNEX A: TABLE OF CASES (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER, BY COUNTRY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT REFERENCE</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>DFIS INVOLVED</th>
<th>REPRISALS (WITH DIRECT CLIENT’S RESPONSIBILITY)</th>
<th>ALLEGED AUTHOR OF REPRISALS</th>
<th>TYPE OF CLIENT</th>
<th>CLIENT</th>
<th>FURTHER INFO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amulsar mine</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>Harassment, threats, smearings, SLAPPs, violent repression of protests</td>
<td>Company’s security personnel, authorities</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Lydian International</td>
<td>Wearing Blinders (pp 21 – 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern gas corridor</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>ADB, AIIB, EBRD, EIB, World Bank</td>
<td>Criminalization, imprisonment, travel ban</td>
<td>Police, government authorities</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Southern Gas Corridor pipeline (partially government-owned), LUKOIL Overseas Shah Deniz Ltd</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 89 – 90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh / COVID-19</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>COVID-19 response project</td>
<td>ADB, AIIB, World Bank</td>
<td>Arbitrary detention, torture</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Bangladesh government</td>
<td>Unhealthy Silence (pp 22 – 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Monte Dam</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>Criminalization, evictions, destruction of properties, attempts to infiltrate the movement, violent repression of protests</td>
<td>Police, government authorities</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Norte Energia</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 58 – 61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jirau Dam</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Consorcio Energia Sustentável do Brasil (ESBR)</td>
<td>* A defender was threatened and killed. The client is likely to be responsible for the reprisals, but clear evidence is lacking. Uncalculated Risks (pp 62–63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Management and Administration Project</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Land management</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Harassment, threats, beatings, surveillance, arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, criminalization</td>
<td>Government authorities, judiciary, police, para-police, and district guards</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Cambodian government</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 81 – 82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidroituango hydroelectric project</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>IDB/IDB Invest, BNDES, KfW Ipek, ICBC</td>
<td>Harassment, threats, stigmatization, defamation, repression of protests, physical attacks, torture, criminalization, mass detention, surveillance</td>
<td>Police and district guards, para-police, judiciary</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Local government of Antioquia, Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM), minority shareholders</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 64–66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT REFERENCE</td>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahli United Bank</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Intimidation, freezing of bank account</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Ahli United Bank</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 69–70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Basic Services Program</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Budgetary support</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Arbitrary detention, criminalization</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Ethiopian government</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 73–74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Rita Hydroelectric project</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>IFC, FMO, DEG, SIFEM, AECID</td>
<td>Criminalization, repression of protests, militarization, threats, destruction of homes, attacks, detentions, smear campaigns, killings</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Ethiopian government</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 73–74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Salá Hydroelectric Project</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>FMO, IFC, IDB Invest, Finnfund, CABI, CMIC</td>
<td>Harassment, defamation, smear campaigns, surveillance, criminalization, detention</td>
<td>Company representatives, private security, judiciary</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Hidrosalá S.A</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 47–49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo and San Andrés dams</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>IDB Invest, CABI, KfW</td>
<td>Smear campaign, militarization, threats, attacks, killings, suppression of protests</td>
<td>Former paramilitary and military personnel as private security guards</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Energía y Renovación S.A.</td>
<td>Wearing Blinders (pp 27–31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinant palm oil plantations</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Intimidation, violent attacks, killings</td>
<td>Company security guards in some cases acting with the military</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Dinant Corporation</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 38–40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agua Zarca Dam</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>Finnfund, FMO, CABI</td>
<td>Threats, surveillance, physical attacks, sexual harassment, criminalization, shootings, killing</td>
<td>Company representatives and employees, hitmen hired by the company, public security forces employed by the company and guarding its headquarters</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Desarrollos Energéticos S.A. (DESA)</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 50–52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPP4 Al-Manakher Power Plant</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Power plant</td>
<td>EBRD, OPIC</td>
<td>Threats, arbitrary detention and interrogations, harassment</td>
<td>Police acting on a complaint allegedly submitted by a company representative, harassment by the company</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>AES Levant Jordan</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 71–72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT REFERENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lukoil Overseas Karachaganak</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Harassment, threats, physical and verbal attacks, discrimination, surveillance, detention</td>
<td>Police, local authorities</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Lukoil Overseas Karachaganak B. V. received funding for the Karachaganak Petroleum Operation B.V., a joint venture partially owned by the government</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 91 – 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa Mariakani Road Project</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Road</td>
<td>AfDB, EIB, KFW, EU- AITF</td>
<td>Harassment, threats</td>
<td>Government authorities</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Kenyan National Highways Authority (KenHA)</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 75 – 76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resource Management Program and Water Tower Protection and Climate Change Programme</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Forest management</td>
<td>World Bank, EDF</td>
<td>Destruction of homes and property, physical attacks, shootings, killings</td>
<td>Forest service guards</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Kenya Forest Service</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 77 – 78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mareña Renovables / Eólica del Sur</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Wind energy</td>
<td>IDB, IDB Invest, EKF, BANOBRA, NAFINSA</td>
<td>Harassment, threats, arbitrary detention, criminalization, physical attacks, cut off basic services</td>
<td>Government authorities, police, judiciary, company representatives and employees, investors and representatives of the company union</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Public private partnership by MMIF, Macquarie Asset Finance Limited and FEMS A, with funds from Mexico’s FONADIN and BANOBRA S</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 61 – 64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East West Corridor Highway Project</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Road</td>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Harassment, threats, dismissals, criminalization, shooting</td>
<td>Security guards, government authorities, judiciary</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Myanmar government</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 85 – 86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Projects in Bataan province</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and BDO Unibank (FI)</td>
<td>*A defender was threatened and killed. It remains unclear who was behind the anonymous threats and the killings, but all reports confirm the defender was killed as a result of her activism. Uncalculated Risks (pp 83 – 84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT REFERENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaliwa Dam</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>Exim Bank of China</td>
<td>Threats, killings</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)</td>
<td>Wearing Blinders (pp 33 - 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minera Yanacocha</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Forced evictions, destruction of homes, physical attacks, repression of protests</td>
<td>Company security personnel, police (coordinating actions with the company)</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Newmont Mining</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 53–54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Bambas Copper Mine</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Repression of protests, physical attacks, unauthorized home searches, arbitrary detentions, killings</td>
<td>Police (coordinating actions with the company)</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Consortium of MMG Guxin International Investment and Citic Metal</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 55–57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marikana Platinum Mine</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Repression, use of excessive force, violence and killings</td>
<td>Company security personnel, police</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Lonmin Company</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 79–80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan / COVID-19</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>COVID-19 response project</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Criminalization, detention</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Turkmenistan government</td>
<td>Wearing Blinders (pp 39–43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toro Semliki reserve</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Conservation of Protected Areas</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Killings, attacks, threats, detentions</td>
<td>Uganda Wildlife Authority Wildlife Authority</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Uganda Special Forces</td>
<td>Wearing Blinders (pp 44–49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP Poultry Facilities</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>EBRD, IFC, EIB</td>
<td>Undue pressure to lease land, harassment, physical attacks</td>
<td>Company*</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Myronivsky Hilboprodukt PJSC (MHP)</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 93–94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cotton sector</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Textile / Agriculture</td>
<td>IPC, ADB, WB, EBRD</td>
<td>Physical attacks, arbitrary detentions, forced treatment, destruction of personal documentation &amp; property, threats, criminalization, travel restrictions and curfews, body cavity searches, confiscation of belongings</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Combination of public and private</td>
<td>Indoroma and Hamkorbank</td>
<td>Uncalculated Risks (pp 95–97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan / COVID-19</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>COVID-19 response project</td>
<td>ADB, AIIB, World Bank</td>
<td>Harassment, physical attacks, detention, criminalization</td>
<td>Police, judiciary</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Uzbek government</td>
<td>Unhealthy Silence (pp 40–42)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>